Supreme Court’s Landmark Judgment: Applicability of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 on Advocates

Consumer Protection Act 2019

In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court of India addressed the long-debated question of whether advocates fall under the ambit of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and its re-enacted version, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The judgment, dated May 14, 2024, in the case of Bar of Indian Lawyers v. D.K. Gandhi PS National Institute of Communicable Diseases and Anr.[1] has firmly established that advocates are not liable for alleged deficiencies in services under these Acts. This decision brings much-needed clarity to the legal profession, which had been under a cloud of uncertainty for years.

Factual Overview

The case that led to this landmark judgment originated from a 2007 order[2] by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC). The respondent had engaged a lawyer for a cheque bouncing case under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The accused agreed to pay the due amount along with expenses, which were handed over to the respondent’s lawyer. The lawyer, however, withheld part of the sum, claiming it was owed as fees. This led the respondent to file a consumer complaint against the lawyer for the recovery of the withheld amount and compensation for harassment and mental agony.

The District Consumer Forum ruled in favor of the respondent, dismissing the preliminary objection regarding jurisdiction. The lawyer appealed to the State Commission, which overturned the District Forum’s decision, stating that lawyers were not covered under Section 2(1)(o)[3] of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. However, the NCDRC reversed the State Commission’s decision, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Key Findings of the Supreme Court

Legislative Intent Behind the Consumer Protection Acts

The Supreme Court began by examining the legislative intent of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and its re-enactment in 2019. The primary objective of these Acts was to protect consumers from exploitation by manufacturers and traders. The Court highlighted that these laws were designed to address the vulnerabilities of consumers in a rapidly evolving market landscape. Importantly, the Court noted that the Acts did not intend to cover professionals, who are distinguished from business or trade entities due to the high level of proficiency and training required in their fields.

The Court emphasized that interpreting the Acts to include professionals would overstretch their scope and undermine their objectives. Bringing professionals under the ambit of the Acts could lead to a flood of vexatious suits, defeating the aim of providing timely and effective dispute resolution for consumers.

Sui Generis Nature of the Legal Profession

The Court then addressed whether the legal profession is sui generis, or unique, compared to other professions. This question arose because the NCDRC had relied on the decision in Indian Medical Association v. VP Shantha[4], which brought medical professionals under the purview of consumer protection laws. The Supreme Court, however, distinguished the legal profession by referring to precedents like State of UP and Ors v. UP State Law[5] Officer Association and Ors. The Court observed that the legal profession’s nobility and unique role in democracy set it apart from other professions.

The Court noted that advocates do not merely provide services to clients but also have a duty to assist the court, reflecting their broader societal role. This multifaceted duty underscores the distinct character of the legal profession, making it unsuitable for inclusion under consumer protection laws designed for commercial entities.

Contract of Personal Service

A critical aspect of the judgment was the interpretation of the term “service” under the Consumer Protection Acts. Both Acts exclude services rendered under a “contract of personal service.” The Court referred to its earlier decision in Dharangdhara Chemical Works Ltd v. State of Saurashtra and Ors.[6], which established that a contract of personal service involves significant control and supervision by the employer over the employee.

Applying this principle, the Court found that clients exercise considerable control over advocates, who act under the authority granted by a “vakalatnama.” This relationship aligns more with a contract of personal service rather than a commercial contract for service. Therefore, the services rendered by advocates are excluded from the definition of “service” under the Consumer Protection Acts.

Implications of the Judgment

The Supreme Court’s judgment has several important implications for the legal profession and the broader consumer protection framework:

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bar of Indian Lawyers v. D.K. Gandhi PS National Institute of Communicable Diseases and Anr. is a landmark ruling that clarifies the scope of the Consumer Protection Acts with respect to the legal profession. By affirming that advocates are not liable under these Acts for alleged deficiencies in service, the Court has upheld the unique nature of the legal profession and its distinct regulatory framework.

This judgment not only brings closure to a long-standing legal question but also reinforces the importance of preserving the nobility and independence of the legal profession. It ensures that advocates can continue to serve their clients and the judicial system without the threat of unwarranted consumer litigation, thereby maintaining the delicate balance between professional accountability and effective legal representation.

[1] CA No. 2646/2009 etc.

[2] K. Gandhi vs M. Mathias REVISION PETITION NO. 1392 OF 2006

[3] “service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service; The Consumer Protection Act, 1986

[4] 1996 AIR 550

[5] 1994 AIR 1654